There is a good reason for EU banks to hold their own country's sovereign debt by Saka, Orkun
There is a good reason for EU banks to hold their own country's 
sovereign debt
LSE Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/103620/
Version: Published Version
Online resource:
Saka, Orkun (2020) There is a good reason for EU banks to hold their own 
country's sovereign debt. LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) blog (14 Jan 
2020). Blog Entry. 
lseresearchonline@lse.ac.uk
https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/ 
Reuse
Items deposited in LSE Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights 
reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private 
study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights 
holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is 
indicated by the licence information on the LSE Research Online record for the item.
There	is	a	good	reason	for	EU	banks	to	hold	their	own
country’s	sovereign	debt
The	so	called	‘moral	suasion’	hypothesis	indicates	that	governments	may	implicitly	force	their
domestic	banks	to	hold	a	larger	chunk	of	government	bonds	when	they	experience	stress.	But	is	this
reason	to	shift	responsibilities	from	national	to	supranational	institutions?	Orkun	Saka	argues	that
there	is	in	fact	a	good	reason	for	EU	banks	to	hold	their	own	country’s	sovereign	debt:	commercial
banks	have	an	informational	advantage	that	allows	them	to	act	as	buyers	of	last	resort,	absorbing	local
assets	while	potentially	uninformed	foreign	banks	may	shed	their	exposure.
Is	it	possible	to	attribute	the	banks’	home	bias	in	sovereign	exposure	to	something	beyond	their	externally-imposed
(such	as	moral	suasion)	or	internally-distorted	(such	as	risk-shifting)	incentives?	Despite	the	so-called	doom	loop
between	the	two,	could	the	relationship	of	banks	with	their	domestic	governments	have	an	underexplored	silver
lining?
These	are	the	questions	I	pursued	in	a	recent	study.	By	using	a	novel	bank-level	dataset	compiled	from	various
stress	tests,	transparency	and	capital	exercises	of	the	European	Banking	Authority	(EBA),	I	first	confirmed	the
previous	literature	by	illustrating	that	the	European	banks’	home	bias	in	sovereign	bonds	almost	doubled	in
response	to	the	Eurozone	crisis.	Figure	1,	constructed	with	a	separate	country-level	dataset,	visually	complements
this	finding	and	additionally	shows	that	this	phenomenon	was	unique	to	financial	intermediaries	compared	with
other	types	of	creditors	situated	in	the	same	set	of	countries;	a	clear	indication	of	commercial	banks	falling	in	love
with	the	sovereign	debt	of	their	own	countries.
Figure	1:	The	rise	and	fall	of	the	Eurozone	banks’	home	bias	in	government	bonds
Note:	The	figure	shows	simple	country	averages	of	sovereign	portion	held	separately	by	resident	banks	and	other	(non-bank)
residents.	Sovereign	Portion	is	defined	as	the	portion	of	the	total	sovereign	debt	of	a	country	held	by	a	creditor	group.	Sovereign
debt	exposure	come	from	the	dataset	compiled	from	various	national	sources	by	Merler	&	Pisani-Ferry	(2012)	and	include	quarterly
observations	from	2005-Quarter1	to	2015-Quarter2.	Core	(non-crisis)	countries:	Belgium,	Finland,	France,	Germany	and
Netherlands.	Periphery	(crisis)	countries:	Greece,	Ireland,	Italy,	Portugal,	Spain.	Source:	Saka	(2019).
Bad	reasons	to	fall	in	love
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So	far,	the	literature	has	mainly	attributed	the	increase	in	sovereign	home	bias	to	the	“moral	suasion”	hypothesis,
namely	the	possibility	that	governments	may	implicitly	force	their	domestic	banks	to	hold	a	larger	chunk	of
government	bonds	when	they	experience	stress.	Another	often-cited	hypothesis	has	been	the	case	of	“risk-shifting”,
where	weakly-capitalised	banks	could	voluntarily	bet	on	risky	government	securities	in	order	to	shift	the	risk	from
shareholders	to	creditors.	A	more	elusive,	but	not	less	important,	channel	has	been	pinpointed	by	Broner,	Martin
and	Ventura	where	well-functioning	secondary	markets	may	pave	the	way	for	the	sovereign	debt	to	flow	back	to	the
issuing	country	in	times	of	high	stress	since	such	reallocation	would	endogenously	prevent	the	sovereign	from
defaulting	on	its	promises.	Finally,	carry-trade	incentives	of	the	domestic	banks	might	be	blamed	for	the	excessive
exposure	to	high-yielding	risky	sovereigns.
With	the	dismal	interaction	between	sovereign	and	banking	crisis	in	the	background,	most	of	this	literature	has
focused	on	listing	the	“bad”	reasons	for	the	increasing	home	bias	that	could	amplify	the	negative	loop	between
banks	and	governments,	and	thus	endanger	financial	stability.	In	my	study,	I	provide	further	evidence	that	this	jump
in	home	bias	during	the	Eurozone	crisis	was	not	unique	to	the	sovereign	debt	category	but	could	be	equally	(if	not
more	intensely)	observed	in	retail	or	corporate	types	of	debt	in	the	very	same	bank	balance	sheets.	This	finding	is
unlikely	to	be	explained	by	the	previous	studies	that	treat	sovereign	debt	as	a	special	category,	and	therefore	ignore
the	possibility	that	the	home	bias	could	partly	be	driven	by	a	more	general	phenomenon	that	could	simultaneously
influence	multiple	asset	types	during	financial	downturns.
A	good	reason	to	fall	in	love:	information
In	a	slightly	different	context,	the	literature	has	already	shown	that	local	banks	stand	at	a	favourable	position	to
have	access	to	soft	information	regarding	their	sovereign	clients	thanks	to	their	“daily	exposure	to	local	news
stories,	first-hand	knowledge	of	the	local	economy,	and	personal	relationships	with	key	people	at	the	issuing	body”.
This	effect	is	found	to	be	strong	especially	when	the	issuing	government	is	riskier.	Consequently,	during	market
downturns,	when	sovereign	risk	rises,	such	an	informational	advantage	might	lead	domestic	banks	to	act	as	buyers
of	last	resort,	absorbing	local	assets	while	(potentially	uninformed)	foreign	banks	may	shed	their	exposure	in	panic.
Indeed	a	theoretical	role	for	the	lack	of	soft	information	and	the	resulting	panic	by	less	informed	foreign	banks	are
consistent	with	the	evidence	that	government	bond	spreads	moved	in	a	self-fulfilling	pessimistic	way	during	the
Eurozone	crisis	and	fell	out	of	touch	with	the	publicly	observable	hard	information	regarding	the	solvency	of
individual	countries.
In	order	to	identify	the	effect	of	information	on	government	bond	holdings	of	the	banks	in	my	sample,	I	first	gathered
various	cross-country	informational	distance	measures	commonly	used	in	the	international	finance/trade	literature.
These	range	from	financial	information	proxies	that	track	the	bank	branch	linkages	(or	historical	merger	activity)
across	countries	to	variables	that	capture	the	common	linguistic	and	media	trends.	However,	directly	checking	the
effects	of	these	proxies	on	banks’	government	bond	holdings	may	not	be	suitable	as	there	exists	the	risk	of	picking
up	unobserved	country/bank	specific	characteristics	or,	more	importantly,	other	types	of	bilateral	cross-country
linkages	that	may	not	have	anything	to	do	with	information.	This	weakness	calls	for	the	second	layer	of	my
identification	strategy	where	I	benefit	from	the	theoretical	prediction	that	the	information	channel	should	be	stronger
for	riskier	assets.
Thanks	to	these	two	layers,	I	could	employ	a	difference-in-differences	model	in	which	I	estimated	the	interaction	of
information	proxies	with	a	measure	of	sovereign	risk	while	saturating	the	model	with	a	full	set	of	fixed-effects,
especially	including	dummies	at	the	level	of	interaction	between	home	country	and	exposure	country	so	that	all
time-invariant	bilateral	cross-country	linkages	could	be	directly	controlled.	This	aspect	is	crucial	for	my	identification
strategy	and	restricts	the	model	to	only	use	the	time	variation	available	in	sovereign	risk	to	be	able	to	identify	the
information	channel.	For	example,	if	British	banks	typically	hold	high	levels	of	Cypriot	government	debt	due	to	their
informational	advantage	in	Cyprus,	I	can	capture	this	only	if	there	is	enough	variation	over	time	in	the	Cypriot
government	bond	spreads;	otherwise	such	pair-specific	relationships	will	all	be	subsumed	by	time-invariant	cross-
country	fixed-effects.
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As	a	result,	I	found	strong	evidence	for	the	argument	that	the	banks	headquartered	in	informationally	closer
territories	increase	their	relative	exposure	as	the	sovereign	risk	rises.	This	effect	is	robust	when	controlling	for
alternative	mechanisms	such	as	the	banks’	risk-shifting	tendency,	the	political	strength	of	their	home	countries	or
the	exchange	rate/redenomination	risk.	Interestingly,	information	seems	to	matter	both	in	the	forms	of	financial	(i.e.,
bank	branch	linkages)	and	general	(i.e.,	common	language)	knowledge	regarding	the	country	of	exposure.	What	is
even	more	interesting	is	that	the	effects	are	statistically	and	economically	meaningful	even	after	the	end	of	the
Eurozone	crisis	(mid-2012).	For	instance,	for	the	country	with	median	sovereign	bond	spreads	in	my	sample
(144bps),	a	change	in	branches	from	0	to	220	(mean	level)	corresponds	to	additional	sovereign	bond	holdings	of
around	5%	at	the	individual	bank	level.	This	effect	is	more	than	four	times	larger	than	the	average	holding	in	my
sample	(1.2%).	In	comparison,	the	size	of	that	effect	is	close	to	50%	of	the	additional	contribution	of	the	crisis	to
average	home	bias	that	was	documented	previously.
Information	vs.	home-bias	channels
As	mentioned	above,	the	recent	literature	has	so	far	emphasised	the	“bad”	ways	of	sovereign	debt	reallocation
specifically	in	the	context	of	sovereign	debt	home	bias.	In	order	to	avoid	the	potential	omitted	variable	problem	that
may	be	caused	by	this	home	bias	phenomenon	and	its	unobserved	channels	(such	as	moral	suasion	or	secondary
markets),	I	took	a	rather	extreme	approach	and	dropped	all	the	domestic	observations	from	the	full	sample	to	report
a	second	set	of	results	only	with	the	banks’	remaining	exposure	to	foreign	countries.	Notice	that	this	is	a
conservative	way	of	identifying	the	role	of	information	on	banks’	government	bond	holdings	since	such	a	channel,	if
it	exists,	would	probably	be	strongest	between	governments	and	domestic	banks.[1]	By	dropping	these	domestic
observations	and	comparing	the	informational	closeness	only	across	foreign	banks,	I	would	potentially	be
underestimating	the	true	magnitude	of	the	information	channel	in	exchange	for	providing	a	cleaner	identification.
In	the	end,	I	confirmed	that	my	results	hold	(even	more	strongly	with	some	proxies	such	as	historical	merger
activity)	when	I	concentrated	only	on	the	banks’	foreign	exposure.	That	is,	ceteris	paribus,	when	foreign	banks
retreated	from	the	sovereign	debt	markets	of	the	crisis	countries	in	the	Eurozone,	they	did	less	so	for	the	countries
to	which	they	were	informationally	closer.
Policy	implications
These	findings	imply	that,	if	the	information	channel	gets	activated	between	governments	and	domestic	banks	in
the	midst	of	a	crisis,	this	may	be	considered	as	a	stabilising	force	compared	to	a	situation	where	even	domestic
banks	would	rush	out	of	the	market	and	governments	would	find	it	impossible	to	roll	over	their	debt.	Therefore,	the
close	link	between	governments	and	their	domestic	banks	may	create	positive	externalities	in	terms	of	mitigating
the	effects	of	sudden	stops	and	preventing	inefficient	sovereign	defaults.
Nevertheless,	policy	discussions	have	so	far	emphasised	shifting	the	regulatory	power	from	national	to
supranational	institutions	to	avoid	moral	suasion	or	coming	up	with	various	innovations	of	debt	issuance	in	order	to
cut	off	the	link	between	sovereigns	and	their	banks.	Taken	at	face	value,	my	results	imply	that	these	precautions
would	not	be	sufficient	to	prevent	the	rising	home	bias	problem	(to	the	extent	that	it	constitutes	a	problem)	during
crises.	Instead,	further	policy	discussions	may	also	focus	on	increasing	transparency	in	the	sovereign	debt	markets
especially	in	times	of	crisis	or	encouraging	more	cross-border	banking	activities	to	improve	the	informational	ties
across	countries.
An	empirical	implication	of	my	results	is	the	possibility	that	the	previous	literature	on	the	rising	sovereign	debt	home
bias	in	the	Eurozone	may	have	been	overestimating	the	role	of	alternative	channels	by	simply	comparing	domestic
bank	exposure	to	foreign	ones	in	the	absence	of	explicit	controls	for	informational	heterogeneity	across	banks.
More	research	is	particularly	needed	in	order	to	understand	the	delicate	nuance	between	information	and	moral
suasion	when	banks	and	governments	are	closely	linked	to	each	other.
[1]	“The	same	personal	and	professional	ties	that	may	allow	sovereigns	to	apply	moral	suasion	on	domestic	banks	might	also	give
domestic	bankers	better	information	about	the	likelihood	of	sovereign	default	or	repayment.”	(Ethan	Ilzetzki’s	discussion
in	Battistini	et	al.,	2014)
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
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Note:	This	blog	post	is	based	on	the	author’s	paper	Domestic	Banks	as	Lightning	Rods?	Home	Bias	and
Information	during	the	Eurozone	Crisis,	CESIFO	Working	Paper	7939	(2019),	also	forthcoming	at	the	Journal	of
Money,	Credit	and	Banking.	A	version	of	this	article	first	appeared	on	our	sister	site,	LSE	Business	Review.	It	gives
the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the	London	School	of
Economics.	Featured	image	via	Pxfuel,	under	a	CC0	licence
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